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AN EXPLORATORY STUDY IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
As a consequence of recent corporate governance reforms, the work of supervisory board 
members in the Dutch two-tier system has become more complex. The objectives of this study 
are to gain more insight in the current challenges that supervisory board members face and 
assess whether they are well-equipped to manage them. Based on a combination of an 
analysis of self-assessment reports, a web-based survey and semi-structured interviews, we 
conclude that the major challenges of supervisory board members lie in the field of interaction 
and collaboration with executives. Distinct ‘challenge areas’ were relatively often perceived 
as problematic as well as important, highlighting the need to improve the current functioning 
of boards. With regard to the skills that are present on supervisory boards, we find that 
individual qualities, like integrity, professionalism and knowledge, are better recognized than 
collective qualities for the supervisory board as a whole. In particular, openness and honesty 
are seen as important, but often lacking. The paper highlights several implications for scholars 
and practitioners. 
 
Key words: board of directors, supervisory board, board roles and skills, corporate 
governance developments, the Netherlands.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decennium shows important developments in the corporate governance systems of 
most Western countries. Global mobility of capital and the spread of the Anglo-American 
shareholder value model have fueled the debate on corporate governance practices around the 
globe (cf. Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Ingley and Van Der Walt, 2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; 
Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Moreover, integrity problems and failing supervision have led to 
numerous corporate scandals, such as Enron, WorldCom and Ahold. As a result financial 
markets have introduced stringent corporate governance regulations such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, EU Company Law Directives and numerous national corporate governance codes 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Enrione et al., 2006; Sheridan et al., 2006). A 
communality in these reform initiatives has been the emphasis on (i) restoring the public’s 
trust and (ii) ensuring that appropriate “checks and balances” are put in place in the regulatory 
system and corporations (Daily et al., 2003). Among others, the rights and duties of 
shareholders, the importance of financial transparency and risk management, and the fiduciary 
role of auditors have been addressed and redefined in these corporate governance reform 
initiatives. 
 Another key topic of debate has been the appropriate role of boards of directors in 
changing corporate governance systems (Bezemer et al., 2011; Corley, 2005; Huse, 2007; 
Huse and Rindova, 2001). Scholars have noted that expectations for boards’ involvement in 
decision-making and supervision have changed and that board roles and structures in most 
Western countries are evolving as a result (Akkermans et al., 2007; Bezemer et al., 2007; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Hillier and McColgan, 2006; Hooghiemstra and Van 
Manen, 2004; Long, 2006; Samuels et al., 1996; Valenti, 2008; Wintoki, 2007). Particularly, 
two factors are contributing to this development. First, multiple corporate governance reform 
initiatives, in line with principles of the agency theory, are being introduced to strengthen 
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board control and board independence (Daily et al., 2003; Enrione et al, 2006; Finegold et al., 
2007). Second, boards of directors have come under closer scrutiny of the public and 
shareholder activists (Cogut, 2007; Loring and Taylor, 2006; Wu, 2004). As a consequence, 
members of boards of directors are increasingly faced with the challenge to “demonstrate 
effective leadership, quality decision-making processes and the ability to exercise corporate 
controls” (Long, 2006:547).  
  While the changing nature of board roles and structures has been well-established in 
the literature (cf. Akkermans et al., 2007; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Hooghiemstra 
and Van Manen, 2004; Long, 2006; Valenti, 2008; Wintoki, 2007), less is known about the 
ways in which growing complexities in business and society affect the functioning of boards 
(Bezemer et al., 2011). For instance: what are the main challenges for boards in contemporary 
society, which functional qualities are highly valued but often lacking (at an individual and 
group level), and when do there exist mismatches between role requirements and functional 
qualities of board members. In this paper we examine this kind of issues by analyzing the 
outcomes of eleven self-assessment reports of supervisory boards, the results of an 
exploratory survey among a sample of Dutch board members and five in-depth interviews 
with well-known Dutch board members. 
 In doing so, we contribute to the literature in at least two ways. First, while prior 
research in general has examined the “usual suspects” and more visible features of boards of 
directors, we examine, instead, the softer factors that might inhibit the board from performing 
adequately. We simultaneously assess challenges that are inherent to the job of director and 
challenges that may result from a lack of skills at the board level. Interestingly, our results 
highlight that corporate governance codes and laws are (often) unable to regulate the softer 
issues that are perceived most critical. This suggests that alternative types of interventions are 
necessary to improve the checks and balances in the corporate governance of listed firms in 
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the Netherlands. Second, while one-tier boards have been investigated quite extensively, we 
provide a more thorough understanding of the challenges that board face on two-tier boards. 
We illustrate that the legal separation of decision control from decision management in two-
tier boards adds an extra layer of complexity to the changing societal expectations of boards.  
 The paper is structured as follows: section one describes recent developments, the 
two-tier board model and reform initiatives in the Netherlands. Section two summarizes 
previous research on challenges in one-tier and two-tier boards. Section three describes the 
research method, i.e., a combination of an analysis of eleven self-assessment reports of 
supervisory boards, an exploratory survey among a sample of Dutch board members and five 
in-depth inter-view with supervisory board members. Section four describes the challenges 
which supervisory board members face in the Netherlands and assesses whether boards have 
the required skills to manage them adequately. Section five concludes with a discussion of our 
key findings and highlights the implications for scholars and practitioners. 
 
THE DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
The roots of the contemporary Dutch open-economy can be found in the glory days of the 
Golden Age. In this era, when the Netherlands were one of the largest trading nations, the 
Dutch founded the ‘Dutch United East India Company’, the first joint stock company in the 
world. With a small group of large, internationally diversified firms and a GDP that is 
dependent on foreign investment and trade (more than 60%), the Dutch trade origins and 
international orientation are still prominent. The Netherlands are a welfare state with a long 
tradition of balancing the interests of societal groups. The Dutch corporate governance system 
is unique in the sense that company law explicitly defines corporations as legal entities which 
must take into account the rights of all stakeholders affected by the company. The 
institutionalized stakeholder approach is supported by a two-tier board model consisting of a 
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management board and a supervisory board. The supervisory board solely consists of non-
executive directors to assure its independence and has the duty by law to supervise and advise 
the management board while acting in the best interests of the company and all stakeholders 
involved (Akkermans et al., 2007; De Jong et al., 2005; 2006; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 
2004; Maassen, 1999; Maassen and Van Den Bosch, 1999). 
 Over the last decade, the corporate governance landscape in the Netherlands has 
changed dramatically with the internationalization of the shareholder base of listed firms. 
Particularly, the share of Anglo-American oriented investor groups (Abma, 2006) and the 
number of foreign directors have increased (Spencer Stuart, 2006). As a result, board 
members are more exposed to foreign investors’ corporate governance expectations and their 
willingness to actively challenge boards of directors. Examples of “successful” shareholder 
activism by foreign investors are the ABN AMRO takeover by a consortium led by the now 
split up Fortis Bank, and Stork, a Dutch technology company, where a hedge fund forced the 
corporation to restructure. Corporate governance scandals (e.g., Ahold, Enron, WorldCom 
and Parmalat) also have fueled the Dutch debate and contributed to amendments to the Dutch 
company law in 2004 and the introduction of a new corporate governance code, the 
Tabaksblat Code, in 2003, which was amended by the committee Frijns in 2008. In sum, these 
developments have contributed to a convergence of the institutionalized stakeholder model 
and the Anglo-American shareholder model in the Netherlands (Bezemer, 2010; Bezemer et 
al., 2007; Van Ees et al., 2003). 
 
COMPARING ONE-TIER AND TWO-TIER BOARDS 
Traditionally, the primary responsibility of the board of directors has been to control the top 
management team to ensure that executives act in the interests of shareholders. The boards’ 
control role is rooted in agency theory and deemed necessary for counteracting managerial 
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opportunism that may arise as a result of the separation of corporate ownership from 
management (Davis et al., 1997; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In addition, scholars have 
recognized the service role of boards, i.e., board members may positively contribute to 
corporate decision-making by providing advice and counseling to executive directors (Huse, 
2005; 2007; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Both board roles appear to be conflicting as the control 
role requires board independence, distance and a focus on the prevention of managerial 
opportunism, while the service role requires from directors interdependence, closeness and a 
focus on joint value creation (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Van Hamel et al., 1998; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
 The control and service roles of boards are organized differently in corporate 
governance systems around the globe. Most investors are familiar with the one-tier board 
model in which executives and non-executives are jointly responsible for both roles. In this 
model, executive directors provide in-depth knowledge of the daily operations of the 
corporation and may raise issues that might otherwise have been neglected in board meetings 
(Davis, 1991; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). The presence of 
executive directors enables the board to contribute to the decision-making process and to 
evaluate the outcomes (Maassen, 1999; Williamson, 1985) at greater speed with fewer 
bureaucratic hurdles (Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). However, scholars have 
observed that insider dominated boards may overlook the opportunities that outsiders may 
offer in terms of alternate knowledge (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; McNulty and Pettigrew, 
1999; Rindova, 1999) and external relationships (Boyd, 1990; Mizruchi, 1996; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Westphal et al., 2001). Insider dominated boards may also jeopardize checks 
and balances as non-executive directors may be better able to provide independent board 
control (Daily et al., 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).  
 While the one-tier model integrates decision management and decision control (Fama 
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and Jensen, 1983), the two-tier board model provides for a formal separation of executive and 
non-executive directors who operate in separate boards with their own specific roles. 
Executive directors are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the firm and the 
supervisory board is responsible for the supervision of management and for providing advice 
and counseling to executives (Christensen and Westenholz, 1999; Hooghiemstra and Van 
Manen, 2004; Maassen and Van Den Bosch, 1999). The independence of the board from 
management is provided by law to ensure that “checks and balances” are in place as the 
supervisory board has the duty to act in the best interests of the firm and its stakeholders. 
Non-executives also may bring in useful resources and knowledge. For instance, directors of 
banks have always played an important role in the intercorporate network in the Netherlands 
(Heemskerk, 2007). A disadvantage of the two-tier system, however, is the additional 
bureaucratic burden on the corporation that may hamper the speed of decision-making 
(Maassen, 1999; Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and create information asymmetries among 
executive directors and non-executive directors (Davis, 1991; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 
2004). Table 1 provides a concluding summary of the main communalities and differences 
between both board models. In the remainder of this paper, we will analyze and discuss the 
challenges that supervisory boards members face in the changing Dutch corporate governance 
context. 
 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
METHODS 
To analyze the main challenges supervisory board members currently face in the Netherlands, 
we utilized various research methods along the three stages of this study. In phase one, we 
compared the outcomes of eleven self-assessment reports1 of boards of supervisory directors. 
                                                 
1 The self-evaluation processes referred to are supported by one of this paper’s authors 
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The outcome of each self-assessment contained the strengths and weaknesses of each board, 
and an action plan to improve the functioning of that board. Examples of 
strengths/weaknesses include among others (in)adequacy of infor-mation for the board and 
(ill)quality communication with the executive board. Furthermore, the self-assessment reports 
provided a good starting point for mapping the functional qualities of individual supervisory 
board members (like ‘integrity’, ‘knowledge and experience’) and the supervisory board as a 
whole (like the ‘one board, one voice’ principle and ‘openness and honesty’). 
In phase two, we used the results of stage one to construct a well-structured 
questionnaire, focusing on challenges in the (supervisory) board room and functional qualities 
of supervisory boards and their members in the Dutch setting. The questionnaire starts off 
with some questions to determine the composition of the sample. Next to this, a question 
section appears, specifically aiming at challenges for supervisory board members. This 
section starts with an open question that tests responses of supervisory board members 
without providing any suggestions (i.e., ‘what challenge(s) do you remember in your function 
as supervisory board member?’). After this, the 17 challenge areas are displayed with the 
option to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If ‘yes’, there was room to add an explanation. This approach 
helped us to determine which percentage of the respondent actually encounters challenges on 
the suggested fields and to provide more qualitative insight in the way those challenges are 
being perceived. In the third part of the questionnaire we asked the respondent’s opinion 
about the importance of the challenges in the 17 challenge areas on a 1 through 5 Likert scale. 
This question enabled us to confront challenge areas with their relative importance. The final 
section of the questionnaire examined the functional qualities of boards and their members. 
The respondent were asked to rank the qualities from 1 (most important) through 7 (least 
important), whereby every number could be used only once per list. This enabled us to 
calculate an average per functional quality. Furthermore, respondents had the option to add 
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qualities and include them in the ranking. Finally, the respondents were asked which qualities 
he or she recognizes most, in person as well as in the supervisory board served. 
In June 2010 we sent the web-based questionnaire to 143 (former) board members, all 
alumni of the Governance University. 41 of them responded within one week, yielding a 
response rate of 29%2. The background of the respondents varied widely in terms of sector 
(ranging from NGO boards and public sector bodies to listed corporations). Over 68% of the 
respondents had one or two board positions at the moment of the research. Almost half of 
these respondents had one to four years of experience (see table 2). 
 
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
 
Finally, in phase three, semi-structured interviews were held in autumn 2010 with 
highly-experienced supervisory board chairmen and former CEOs of listed firms on the 
NYSE Euronext in the Netherlands (see table 3). As to the selection of participants, we used 
convenience sampling (all interviewees were contacts of the Governance University), given 
well-known difficulties for researchers to obtain access to individuals at this level of analysis 
(Daily et al., 2003; Pettigrew, 1992). Aim of the interviews was to falsify our stage two 
results and obtain expert opinions about the required steps to further improve the functioning 
of supervisory boards in the Netherlands. 
 
---- Insert Table 3 about here ---- 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Main Challenges Supervisory Boards 
While the changing nature of board roles and structures has been well-established in the 
literature, less is known about the ways in which growing complexities in business and 
                                                 
2 7 respondents were currently not in function as supervisory board member and only filled in part of the survey 
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society affect the functioning of boards. The results of our survey indicate that most of our 
respondents face quite some challenges in their job as supervisory board member: 88% of the 
34 respondents indicates that (s)he has experienced a challenge in four or more (of the 17 
distinguished) areas and more than 40% of them reports more than seven challenge areas. The 
average number of challenges per respondent amounted 5.9. Interestingly, the number of 
challenges seems neither to be related to the number of board positions, nor to the number of 
years experience. 
 
---- Insert Figure 1 about here ---- 
 
A closer examination of our survey results shows that most supervisory board members 
declared an operational problem as most striking, like the implementation of a risk 
management system, integrating businesses after an international merger or approving the 
long term strategy. All these examples simply regard to the operational side of the supervising 
task and do not refer to the functioning of the supervisory board itself. In the latter category, 
the most mentioned key challenges were (i) interrogating the board when necessary (82%), 
(ii) working together with the executive board (67%), and (iii) having constructive and useful 
meetings (50%) (see figure 2).  
 
---- Insert Figure 2 about here ---- 
 
Table 4 reports the result of the question ‘[h]ow important do you think that a 
challenge in one of the following areas is to the well-functioning of a supervisory board?’. 
While the scores are generally high for all categories, integrity is considered to be most 
important (4.8), followed by the category interrogation (4.6). Interestingly, questioning the 
executive board also scored high as problem area. The lowest in rank are challenges in the 
area of statutes and by-laws, although still perceived as important with an average score of 
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3.6. 
 
---- Insert Table 4 about here ---- 
 
Using the urgency/importance framework of Covey et al. (1994), juxtaposing the most 
frequent and most important challenges tells us which areas of the functioning of boards 
deserve the highest priority. Figure 3 displays the outcome of this analysis, using the mean as 
cut-off to classify challenges as (un)important and (in)frequent. As shown in the upper left 
corner, four board issues seem to be most prominent. The challenge area with the highest 
priority seems to be the interrogation of the executive board. Problems in this area are 
perceived as very important (4.6). These results highlight a lack of transparency from the 
executive board in the direction of the supervisory board. As one of our interviewees 
remarked: “an executive director that wants maximum freedom tends to dwindle into 
vagueness and promises”. The solution seems to be, as one respondent remarked, 
“questioning, questioning and, again, interrogating”. When the executive board does not 
provide clarity after this questioning session, some respondents admit that they give up (too) 
easily. Some respondents are very distinct about this: “it is a clear case that executive 
directors have to answer all supervisory board questions completely, whether they perceive 
the questions relevant or not. Executive directors are obliged to answer”. From the results we 
conclude, however, that four out of five supervisory directors find this problematic.  
 The analysis above also shows that social intercourse and working with the executive 
board is another challenge area that has high priority: 67% of the respondents have 
experienced challenges in this field once or more and the importance rate is 4.3. Some of the 
problems in this area can be related to the information supply, on itself a high priority area 
with 47% and 4.4 scores on recognition and importance, respectively. Respondents remarked, 
among others: “In some cases, the information supply is not based on the needs of supervisory 
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board members whatsoever”, “a tsunami of data was produced” and “the executive board 
does not play an active role in bringing up information at all”.  
 The fourth and final area that lies within this quadrant is role confusion: 47% of the 
respondents have experienced challenges there and find them  important (score 4.2). 
Experiences in this area vary. For instance, one respondent notifies his case, in which the 
supervisory board regularly involves in executive tasks – which is not desirable in the two-tier 
system. Another declares an opposite view, where the executive “thinks he’s in charge”. 
Some point out role complications as a result of mergers of structure changes. At the same 
time there is consensus that role confusion can be overcome by addressing the challenge to 
the executive board and create consent. 
 
---- Insert Figure 3 about here ---- 
 
Functional Qualities of Supervisory Boards and Members 
Judging the different functional qualities for members of the supervisory board as well as the 
supervisory board as a whole was performed by raking them: the lower the rate, the higher the 
ranking. The questions were as follows: ‘rank the functional qualities mentioned below in an 
order of most important (rank 1) to least important (rank 7) to a well-functioning board 
member’, and ‘rank the functional qualities mentioned below in an order of most important 
(rank 1) to least important (rank 7) to a well-functioning board’. By summing up all scores 
and dividing the total by the number of respondents, we were able to calculate an average 
score per functional quality. Again, the lower the score, the more important the functional 
quality is perceived to be.  
 As shown in table 5, the qualities independence (2.9), integrity (3.0) and knowledge 
and experience (3.3) are the most highly valued individual traits. Remarkably, individual’s 
network (5.9) and contribution to the team spirit (4.9) are not deemed very important. At the 
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group level, openness and honesty within the board (2.9), complementarities between 
members (2.9) and a competent chairman (3.1) are the most important ingredients of a well-
functioning board. Quite interestingly, board committees (5.4) and informal contacts (5.9) are 
not valued that much. In sum, at both levels, it seems that the objective skills and abilities of 
the board and its members are mostly appreciated. 
---- Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here ---- 
 
Finally, the respondents were asked to point out what functional quality (with a 
maximum of five) they recognized most by themselves and their supervisory board. As shown 
in table 7, our respondents mostly recognize the earlier mentioned qualities integrity, 
knowledge and experience, and independence, while the presence of a personal network, the 
well-functioning of committees and the existence of informal relations in the boardroom are 
the least identified ones. 
 
---- Insert Table 7 about here ---- 
 
We also drafted a cross table for the functional qualities that were part of the research. 
By confronting the relative importance with the functional qualities that respondents 
recognize most in their own situation, we can analyze which areas are most critical and 
deserve attention. ‘Important’ is again classified as on or above average and ‘less important’ 
is classified as below average. Because the lower the score is, the higher the importance, this 
means that scores from 1 to 4 are labeled ‘important’ and scores higher than 4 (maximum is 7, 
the score for the lowest recognition). For the recognition of functional qualities, we followed 
the same method. The average percentage of recognition is 36. A quality aspect can be 
recognized on or above average on the one hand, and below average on the other.  
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Using the same Covey et al. (1994) method as described earlier, we can conclude that 
the qualities openness and honesty and One Board, One Voice have the highest priority (see 
table 8). These qualities score on or above average in importance and are relatively often 
recognized. Interestingly, both qualities refer to the supervisory board as a whole. It is 
remarkable that openness and honesty is on top of the list of collective qualities, while, at the 
same time, the informal relation of the supervisory board members with executives ends 
below. This could imply that respondents do not object against a formal relation with the 
executive board, as long as openness and honesty are key.  
At the same time, it is remarkable that 4 out of 7 individual qualities are box ticked by 
more than half of the respondents, while not one of the collective qualities did receive that 
much support. From this outcome we conclude that individual qualities are more relevant to 
the target group than collective qualities. We could check the validity of this conclusion by 
ranking all outcomes (i.e. individual and collective qualities in only one list. If we would do 
that, openness and honesty would not be on top of the list but only fifth in rank, after four 
individual qualities: independence, integrity, knowledge and experience, and professionalism.  
Finally, we asked the respondents to suggest functional qualities that could be an addition 
to the list. Affinity with the mission and activities of the company is one individual quality that 
was suggested, as well as being able to relativize, having humor and empathy, and being 
involved and enthusiastic. As collective quality diversity in board composition was suggested.  
 
---- Insert Table 8 about here ---- 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The past decennium shows important and rapid developments in the corporate governance 
systems of most Western countries (Ingley and Van Der Walt, 2005; Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007). Generally, scholars have shown that these changes had a 
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significant impact on the “checks and balances” and role of different stakeholders. In this 
paper, we have discussed the impact of these changes on the challenges supervisory boards 
and their members face. A combination of an analysis of an analysis of eleven self-assessment 
reports of supervisory boards, an exploratory survey among a sample of Dutch board members 
and five in-depth inter-view with supervisory board members, revealed that boards face 
important challenges that need urgent attention. In particular, challenging the executive board 
when necessary, working together with executives and obtaining sufficient quality 
information were seen as key areas of improve-ment. While our respondents generally feel 
that board members and boards are adequately skilled to perform, they assert that openness 
and honesty is critical, but regularly lacking. Interestingly, all these issues refer to relatively 
soft board and personal skills, elements that are not codified in corporate governance (self-
)regulation.  
 These findings have three major implications for scholars and practitioners. First, the 
fact that most of our respondents experience several important challenges related to the 
functioning of supervisory boards and to the absence of certain group skills (i.e., openness, 
honesty and unity), seriously questions the current effectiveness of supervisory boards in 
monitoring management. Our study highlighted that it is particularly necessary to strengthen 
the position of supervisory boards and (further) improve the information flow between both 
boards. Second, the increased challenges associated with the supervisory board function, may 
put pressure on the non-executive market, as the pool of willing and qualified future 
candidates might become smaller. Simulta-neously, this development may provide 
opportunities for executive search firms. Their services may become more valuable as it 
becomes more difficult for firms to find qualified candidates who are able to perform 
adequately. Moreover, the need for such companies to provide aid in educating and evaluating 
supervisory board members might increase as well. Third, our results suggest that corporate 
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governance codes and laws are (so far) unable to regulate the softer board issues that are 
perceived most critical for the functioning of supervisory boards. Interestingly, well-regulated 
elements, such as the presence board committees, are not deemed very important. Overall, this 
suggests that other intervention types might be more successful in tackling critical board 
challenges. For instance, establishing more social control, strengthening the role of the board 
secretary, regularly involving a third party or enlarging the power of shareholders might be 
beneficial ways forward. 
 This exploratory study has several limitations, but also provides avenues for future 
research. First, this study has treated all supervisory board positions similarly in order to 
establish a general trend. However, the specific challenges face may be contingent on the 
specifics of a firm’s internal and external context. For example, future studies could 
investigate how a firm’s size, ownership structure (family versus dispersed ownership), 
mission (profit versus non-profit) network structure (peripheral versus central network 
position) and international exposure affect a board’s challenges and the required functional 
qualities. Furthermore, in line with our choice for the individual as one of the units of 
analysis, our observations might be contingent on a director’s background, i.e., his/her status, 
professional training and experience. Second, we tend to see the outcomes of this study as 
impressions and a as ‘relative truth’ due to the fact that the research scale is limited. We had 
41 respondents, of which 34 actually were in function as supervisory director at the moment 
of the research. It would be helpful to enlarge the number of respondents in order to receive 
more in-depth insights. Nevertheless, our exploratory design highlights the need to go beyond 
structural board characteristics and focus on the softer board processes and skills. Third, our 
findings may be contingent on the Dutch context. Future research studies could examine to 
which extent the similar developments are observable in other countries with a two-tier board 
model (for instance, Austria and Germany) and in countries with mixed board models (for 
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instance, Denmark, France, Italy and Macedonia). Fourth, although our results are clear about 
the challenges that supervisory directors most often experience, we obtained relatively little 
insight in why these challenges exist and where they come from. Future research could exa-
mine these interesting issues in more detail. 
 To conclude, our exploratory study has shown that supervisory boards and their 
members are confronted with important challenges in the Netherlands. In particular, the 
interaction between the supervisory board and management board remains an area of concern. 
Our respondents also highlight the need for more openness, honesty and unity in the board 
room. Interestingly, our respondents mainly hinted at problems that go far beyond the ‘usual 
suspects’ and visible features of boards of directors, once again highlighting the need to 
investigate actual board behaviour, dynamics and processes in more detail. Given the 
inherently social nature of these elements, there lies ahead a huge challenge for scholars and 
practitioners to contribute to a further improvement of the checks and balances in Western 
corporate governance systems. 
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Table 1: Role of the Chairman in Different Board Models* 
 
* Source: Adapted from Maassen, 1999 
 
 
 
Table 2: Background Respondents of the Survey 
 
 How many supervisory board positions do you have at the moment? 
How many years 
of experience do 
you have as a 
supervisory 
board member? 
 0* 1 2 3 or 
more 
Row 
Total 
1-4 4
100%
9
64.3%
3
25%
2 
25% 
18
47.4%
5-8 0
0%
4
28.6%
5
41.7%
3 
37.5% 
12
31.6%
>8 0
0%
1
7.1%
4
33.3%
3 
37.5% 
8
21.1%
Column Total 4
10.5%
14
36.8%
12
31.6%
8 
21.1% 
38
100%
* In total 3 respondents are not included in the table, because of having no supervisory board member position at 
the moment of the research. The answers of these respondents are, just like the 4 respondents that also do not 
have a supervisory board member position at the moment of the research but do have 1-4 years of experience, 
only used in the questions about opinions and rankings. 
  
Board characteristics One-tier Board Model Two-tier Board Model 
Composition Executive and non-executive 
directors operate in one board. 
Executive and non-executive 
directors operate in separate 
boards. 
Committees Mandatory or recommended. Recommended. 
Orientation Shareholder/Stakeholder oriented. Stakeholder oriented. 
Countries Most countries, among others 
used in the United Kingdom and 
United States. 
Quite uncommon. Among 
others used in Germany and 
the Netherlands. 
CEO Duality Possible. Not possible. 
Independence Not necessary. Required. 
Authority, liability Same (legal) position as 
executives. 
Different (legal) position as 
executives. 
Tasks, responsibilities Co-directing. Supervising. 
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Table 3: Overview Interviewed Directors 
 
Rob Pieterse Former CEO of WoltersKluwer NV, Non-executive Board Member 
SAB Miller, Supervisory Board Chairman Royal Grolsch NV, 
member Committee-Tabaksblat 
Kees Storm Former CEO of AEGON NV, Supervisory Board Chairman AEGON 
NV, Pon Holdings, Royal KLM, Non-executive Board Member 
Unilever, InBev S.A., Baxter International 
 
Tineke Bahlmann Non-executive Board Member ING Group NV, Nedap NV 
Rob van den Bergh Former CEO of VNU / The Nielsen Company, Non-executive Board 
Member TomTom, Pon Holdings, VNU Media 
 
Peter Elverding Former CEO of DSM NV, Supervisory Board Chairman Océ, ING 
Group NV, Supervisory Board Member SHV, Friesland Campina, 
Supervisory Board Vice Chairman Q-Park 
 
Figure 1: Number of challenge areas per respondent (n=34) 
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Figure 2: Have you ever encountered a challenge in the area of … ? (n=34) 
 
Table 4: Average importance per area, n=41, scale 1 to 5 
 
 Average Std. Dev. 
Integrity 4.8 0.469 
Interrogation 4.6 0.530 
Information supply 4.4 0.586 
Social intercourse and working with the executive 
board 
4.3 0.609 
Willingness to justify 4.3 0.784 
Unclear roles between boards 4.2 1.000 
Chairman’s role 4.2 0.659 
Integral responsibility 4.1 0.726 
Relation distance/involvement 4.0 0.589 
Members of the supervisory board 4.0 0.697 
Advisory role towards executive board 3.9 0.600 
Attention for subjects like ICT, HRM etc 3.9 0.565 
Board dynamics 3.9 0.726 
Effectiveness and efficiency of board meetings 3.9 0.566 
Employer’s task towards executive board 3.9 0.751 
Stakeholder orientation 3.8 0.616 
Statutes and by-laws 3.6 0.880 
Average: total 4.1 0.668 
Figure 3: Board challenges – Frequency versus Importance 
 
 Important Less important 
Integrale benadering
Statuten en reglementen
Bereidheid tot verantwoording
Integriteit
Adviserende functie 
Dynamiek binnen de RvC/RvT
Rol van de voorzitter
Stakeholders
Verhouding distantie/betrokkenheid
Inhoudelijke verdieping
Werkgeversfunctie
Leden van de RvC/RvT zelf
Rolverwarring
Informatievoorziening
Vergaderingen
Omgang en samenwerking met het bestuur
"Doorvragen" bij het bestuur
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Respondenten
Ja
Nee
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Relatively 
often 
experienced 
 Interrogation 
 Information supply 
 Social intercourse and working 
with the executive board  
 Role confusion 
 
 
(high priority; immediate action) 
 Proportion ‘being distant’ versus 
‘being involved’ 
 Board members  
 Focus on content 
 Meetings 
 Employer’s task 
 
(take action if time) 
 
 
Relatively not 
often 
experienced 
 Integrity 
 Accountability (attitude) 
 Role of Chairman 
 
 
 
(Take preventive measures) 
 Integral Approach 
 Advisory Role 
 Team dynamics 
 Stakeholder Orientation 
 Statutes, by-laws 
 
(Low priority; no action) 
  Source: Adapted from Covey et al. (1994) 
 
 
Table 5: Ranking of Individual Board Qualities (n=40, ranking 1 to 7) 
 
Functional Quality Total points Average 
Independence  115 2,9 
Integrity 120 3,0 
Knowledge & experience 132 3,3 
Professionalism  148 3,7 
Availability (attendance) 175 4,4 
Team spirit 196 4,9 
Personal Network  234 5,9 
 
 
Table 6: Ranking of Group Board Qualities (n=40, ranking 1 to 7) 
 
Functional Quality Total points Average 
Openness & honesty 114 2,9 
Complementarity  115 2,9 
Competent Chairman 127 3,2 
Relation to executive board 156 3,9 
‘One board one voice’ 157 3,9 
Board committees 216 5,4 
Informal relation 235 5,9 
Table 7: Recognition of Functional Qualities (n=41) 
 
 
Which of the functional qualities below do you recognize most 
in yourself and your their supervisory board? Choose five. 
Response 
Percentage 
Response 
Total 
Integrity  
 
 
27 67.5% 
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Knowledge & experience 
 
 
26 65% 
Independence  
 
 
24 60% 
Professionalism 
 
 
21 52.5% 
Relationship with exec board 
 
 
19 47.5% 
Complementarity 
 
 
19 47.5% 
Competent Chairman 
 
 
16 40% 
Openness & honesty 
 
 
14 35% 
Availability  
 
 
11 27.5% 
Team spirit 
 
 
9 22.5% 
'One board, one voice'- principle 
 
 
6 15% 
Personal Network 
 
 
5 12.5% 
Board committees 
 
 
5 12.5% 
Informal relation 
 
 0 0% 
 
Table 8: Functional Qualities - Importance versus Recognition 
  Important  Less important 
 
 
Recognized 
relatively 
often as 
lacking 
 Openness and honesty 
 ‘One Board, One Voice’ – Principle 
 
 
 
(high priority; immediate action) 
 Availability 
 Team spirit 
 Personal Network 
 Board committees 
 Informal Relation 
 
(take action if time) 
 
Recognized 
relatively 
little as 
lacking 
 Independence 
 Integrity 
 Knowledge and experience 
 Professionalism 
 Complementarity 
 Competent Chairman 
 Relation with  executive board e 
  
 (take preventive measures) 
 
 
